tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7696446405100112491.post7340543277517864813..comments2023-10-31T06:45:58.112-08:00Comments on The Least of All Evils: StrategyDale Sheldon-Hesshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07974707193305445403noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7696446405100112491.post-11447924423435449112009-05-16T12:22:00.000-08:002009-05-16T12:22:00.000-08:00I'll admit, a lot of Dr. Smith's writing isn't wha...I'll admit, a lot of Dr. Smith's writing isn't what you could call "good marketing." He's a scientist, not a salesman, so he always give the honest results of his work, not the spun-up version.<br /><br />The quorum rule was developed because other people were afraid of an unknown group of fanatics; in practice, most people who aren't familiar with a candidate give them a zero score. So yes, the author doesn't think it would really be necessary; but if someone were afraid of that scenario, the quorum rule is there.<br /><br />Typically, the quorum would account for fewer votes than the number of signatures needed to get on the ballot in most jurisdictions, so it's almost redundant.Dale Sheldon-Hesshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07974707193305445403noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7696446405100112491.post-48407967407775526042009-05-15T15:53:00.000-08:002009-05-15T15:53:00.000-08:00This page is not very helpful:
http://rangevoting....This page is not very helpful:<br />http://rangevoting.org/BetterQuorum.html<br />(...)<br /><I>The optimum value of T is presumably roughly 50% of the size of the largest set of fanatics anybody can organize to support them while at the same time staying unknown to the rest of society, or at least inspiring no interest. (It is very hard both to organize your fanatics and stay unknown at the same time, so I do not expect this number will be very large, percentagewise.) </I>(...)<br />That may not even be<br />the worst part. The whole entry doesn't inspire a lot of confidence since it's about the difficulty(but apparent necessity) of providing a solution for a problem that the author claims doesn't exist.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7696446405100112491.post-51414061771469572762009-05-10T09:16:00.000-08:002009-05-10T09:16:00.000-08:00Yes, I do assume that, as I stated in the third pa...Yes, I do assume that, as I stated in the third paragraph. The stratgy sections are how to maximize your expected utility under that assumption. And at the end I briefly cover the messy case where that's not a good assumption at the end. To recap for you:<br /><br />When it's hard to determine the front-two, then plurality and IRV force you to choose: play it safe, and vote for the lesser of two evils, or play it honest, and risk electing the "greatest evil".<br /><br />Approval and range don't force that choice; you can put your honest favorite on top AND have maximum effect on the front-two's fight; at worst, you get your second choice rather than your first.Dale Sheldon-Hesshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07974707193305445403noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7696446405100112491.post-16056359338852805082009-05-09T06:52:00.000-08:002009-05-09T06:52:00.000-08:00You assume that voters will know who the strongest...You assume that voters will know who the strongest candidates are and can give one of them maximum support and the others minimum support, then vote sincerely for the "sure losers."<br /><br />But what if you're not sure where people stand -- or support your favorite may have a chance to win, but probably will lose. You're going to want to give maximum support to your favorite and no support to others.<br /><br />This will be a much more normal situation than the one you lay out.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com